

Intrusion Detection Systems using Decision Tree Algorithms

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ABSTRACT

Intrusion detection systems (IDS) using decision tree algorithms offer a balance between detection accuracy and computational efficiency in engineering networks. This manuscript presents a comprehensive study of IDS design and evaluation, focusing on decision tree classifiers available up to 2013. We develop an experimental framework using a labeled dataset of network traffic, extract statistical features such as packet size, duration, and protocol type, and apply decision tree induction methods (C4.5, CART) to classify normal versus intrusive behavior. A methodology combining feature selection, cross-validation, and confusion-matrix metrics is detailed. Statistical analysis illustrates classifier performance under varying training proportions, simulation experiments in a network simulator emulate attack scenarios (DoS, probing, U2R). Results indicate that properly pruned decision trees achieve detection rates above 93 % with false-positive rates below 6 %. Five research objectives guide the study. Conclusions discuss trade-offs and recommend deployment guidelines.

KEYWORDS

Intrusion Detection, Decision Tree, C4.5, CART, Network Security, Feature Selection, Simulation, Detection Rate, False Positive Rate, Cross-Validation

INTRODUCTION

Intrusion detection systems are essential components of network security architectures, monitoring traffic and identifying malicious activities. Decision tree algorithms, such as C4.5 (Quinlan, 1993) and Classification and Regression Trees (CART) (Breiman et al., 1984), present intuitive model structures that can be interpreted by engineers and integrated into real-time systems due to their low computational overhead. This study focuses on IDS designs based strictly on technology and methods available by 2013, avoiding any techniques or nomenclature introduced after 2013. We review earlier work, define feature sets, and implement well-established decision tree induction processes. The contribution lies in a systematic evaluation under controlled conditions, statistical analysis of classifier robustness, and realistic simulation of common attack types.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Research on decision tree-based IDS predates 2013 and has demonstrated favorable detection performance.

Chan and Stolfo (1998) first applied C4.5 to network audit data, reporting detection rates around 85 % for probing attacks. Lee et al. (2000) extended rule extraction methods to improve interpretability. The DARPA 1998 dataset (Tavallae et al., 2009) became a benchmark, studies using various decision tree variants (e.g., LVQ tree ensembles) showed incremental gains. By 2005, researchers incorporated feature selection via information gain and chi-square tests to reduce dimensionality, improving speed and accuracy (Tsai et al., 2009). CART's pruning strategies were refined to lower false positives (Lin et al., 2006). Comparative studies by Mukkamala et al. (2002) showed decision trees outperformed k-nearest neighbors for DoS detection under equal training sizes. In 2010, the NSL-KDD dataset addressed duplicate record biases (Tavallae et al., 2009). In 2012, Zhang and Zulkernine proposed weighted decision trees to handle imbalance, achieving detection rates above 90 % on NSL-KDD. However, most evaluations lacked realistic network simulation, relying solely on static datasets. This manuscript fills that gap by combining dataset experiments with packet-level simulation in NS-2/NS-3 to emulate TCP-based attacks.




Fig: Developing Robust Intrusion Detection System

METHODOLOGY

We adopt a two-stage methodology: dataset evaluation and simulation validation. Stage 1 uses the NSL-KDD dataset (pre-2013) comprising 41 numeric and categorical features. Categorical features (protocol_type, service, flag) are encoded via one-hot vectors. Continuous features (duration, src_bytes, dst_bytes) are normalized. Feature selection employs information gain ranking, top 20 features retained. Decision tree

models C4.5 and CART are trained using 10-fold cross-validation in Weka 3.6. Performance metrics include detection rate (DR), false positive rate (FPR), precision, recall, and F1-score. Pruning parameters (confidence factor 0.25 for C4.5, minimal leaf size 5 for CART) are tuned via grid search. Stage 2 configures NS-2 version 2.35 to simulate a LAN of 20 nodes behind a router. Traffic includes FTP, HTTP, and SMTP flows generated by traffic generators. Attack scenarios include TCP SYN flood (DoS), port scanning (probing), and U2R (buffer overflow emulated via custom packet injector). Packet-level features are extracted from trace files using AWK scripts matching NSL-KDD feature definitions. The same decision tree models classify trace-derived feature vectors in real time.

RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

1. To implement and compare C4.5 and CART decision tree classifiers for IDS using features available by 2013.
2. To evaluate classifier performance on NSL-KDD dataset via cross-validation and statistical analysis of DR and FPR.
3. To select an optimal feature subset using information gain ranking to balance accuracy and computational cost.
4. To simulate realistic network attack scenarios (DoS, probing, U2R) in NS-2, extracting features compatible with dataset experiments.
5. To assess classifier robustness under simulated traffic conditions and provide deployment guidelines for engineering environments.

STATISTICAL ANALYSIS

Table 1 presents DR and FPR for both classifiers under three training-testing splits.

Metric	Training Split	C4.5 DR (%)	C4.5 FPR (%)	CART DR (%)	CART FPR (%)
	70% – 30%	92.3	5.8	91.0	6.4
	80% – 20%	93.5	5.2	92.1	5.9
	90% – 10%	94.0	4.9	92.8	5.5

SIMULATION RESEARCH

In the NS-2 simulation, Node 0 acts as attacker for each scenario. Normal traffic: three FTP clients (Nodes 1–3), four HTTP clients (4–7), and two SMTP clients (8–9) connect to a server (Node 19). Traffic generators produce Poisson arrivals with mean rates matching NSL-KDD. For the TCP SYN flood, Node 0 sends 100 packets/s of SYN only, targeting port 80. In probing, Node 0 scans ports 1–1024 at 50 ports/s. U2R is emulated by injecting malformed payloads in 10 % of HTTP GET requests. Packet trace files are post-processed to

extract features. Classifier models from Stage 1 are embedded into a C++ module interfaced via Tcl, allowing on-the-fly decision making. Experiments run for simulated time of 600 s, repeated five times to account for randomness. Memory usage, classification time per instance, and detection metrics are logged.

RESULTS

Table 2 summarizes simulation outcomes averaged over runs. Metrics include detection delay (time between first attack packet and alert), DR, FPR, and classification latency.

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C4.5 achieved highest DR for DoS attacks, with sub-second detection delay. CART yielded slightly lower DR but marginally lower classification latency. Memory footprint remained under 20 MB for both models, suitable for embedded deployment. Statistical confidence intervals at 95 % level for DR are ± 1.2 %.

CONCLUSION

This study demonstrates that decision tree algorithms available by 2013 can provide high detection performance for IDS when combined with careful feature selection and simulation validation. C4.5 offers a favorable trade-off between DR and FPR, detecting over 94 % of TCP SYN flood attacks with minimal latency. CART provides slightly faster classification but at the cost of a minor decrease in accuracy. Feature selection via information gain reduces model complexity by 50 % without degrading performance. Simulation in NS-2 confirms robustness under realistic traffic patterns. For engineering deployment, we recommend C4.5 pruned trees with a confidence factor of 0.25, implemented as embedded modules with precomputed decision rules. Future work (post-2013) might explore ensemble methods and deep learning, but within the 2013 scope, decision trees remain a practical IDS solution.

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